جدول المحتويات
Introduction
Throughout history, Turkish-Iranian or Ottoman-Safavid relations have been characterized by clashes and conflicts. For the sake of clarity, the historical conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids for the hegemony over the Islamic world was intense throughout history. The Iranians were looking for an opportunity to lead the Islamic world since the Middle Ages. However, their schemes were prevented by the Ottoman power. In contradiction to this epoch, the period of the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the Pahlavi kingdom in Iran was characterized by very good relations, and the founder Reza Shah Pahlavi did not hide his admiration for Ataturk and the Republic. (1923 -1925) Relations between the two countries took a new crescendo with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, specifically during the Iran-Iraq war, and remained so until the rise of the AKP Party to power in 2002.
Turkish-Iranian Relations under AKP rule
Economic cooperation
The tightening of sanctions on Iran affected the trade exchange between the two countries tremendously. Iran mainly depends on Turkish goods in light of the international sanctions imposed on it. Turkey imports about 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Iran, and this covers about 30 % of its own needs().
We have a chart from Yeni Şafak magazine that highlights the volume of trade between Turkey and Iran(), where we can observe how trade between the two countries has grown since the AK Party came to power. For example, in 2000 before the coming of AKP the volume of trade was 1.1 billion Dollars in 2000, and after eight years and exactly in 2008 it became 10.2 billion Dollars. That is, it doubled tenfold in just 8 years.
The exchange was slightly affected during the years 2009 and 2010 by the economic sanctions imposed on Iran due to its nuclear project, as the volume of exchange decreased to 5.4 billion Dollars. With the reduction of sanctions, the volume of exchange increased again, but in 2013 and due to the sanctions imposed by the Obama administration on Tehran, the volume of exchange decreased from approximately $22 billion in 2012 to $13.7 billion in 2014().
The impact of trade exchange between the two countries is negatively affected by the United Nations and American decisions regarding Tehran's nuclear project, which prompted Ankara to mediate to find a solution to this issue.
Nuclear file
By exploiting its good relations with Iran, Turkey sought to find a solution to this issue. Ankara, along with Brazil, mediated the Iranian nuclear file in May 2010 (visit of Erdogan and Da silva to Tehran). Ankara, along with Brazil, mediated in the Iranian nuclear file in May 2010. ()
Both countries tried to spare Tehran the international sanctions to be imposed on it to preserve their commercial interests with them, and it was the last chance for the Iranians to avoid those sanctions. But the Turkish-Brazilian proposal was rejected by the Obama administration. Although Tehran welcomed the Brazilian-Turkish proposal, the United States of America dealt with this mediation with indifference and disinterest at that time().
Turkey has never objected to Iran's right to enrich uranium and obtain peaceful nuclear energy, but this does not negate the existence of Turkish concerns about this file. These are hidden fears that Ankara bears. Allowing its Iranian neighbor into a nuclear state will break the balance of the entire region.
Despite Ankara's membership in NATO, which includes many nuclear countries, it is aware that it cannot rely on NATO's nuclear umbrella in the event of any conflict with Tehran, as Turkey's NATO allies denied it in many files and let it down.
Although Ankara has not shown any fears about this file, this does not prevent it from being wary of Tehran on this point in particular, and the two countries share several burning regional files.
Shared files between the two countries
The Kurdish Question
Saddam Hussein put both sides in trouble when he gave the Kurds autonomy in northern Iraq.
Distinguishing the Turkish-Iranian relationship with the duality of enmity and friendship at the same time in general, it is particularly evident concerning the Kurdish question. Ankara has a special relationship with the Kurdistan government in northern Iraq. There exist cooperation between them in the field of energy. Moreover, Turkish support of Massoud Barzani’s conflict against his rival Jalal Talabani is beneficial for the interests of the Turks. On the same side, Iran sometimes supports the Kurdistan Workers’ Party PKK, which is classified by Turkey and the United States as a terrorist organization(). Although Iran is at war with one of its separatist branches in the west of the country in the West Azerbaijan region on the Turkish-Iraqi border, which is known as the PJAK.
But all this does not prevent to qualify that the Kurdish file could be considered among the thorniest issues. To be much more precise, the existence of a Kurdish state is a threat for the two countries. The security and intelligence cooperation between the two countries intensified during the year 2010, Turkey cooperated with Iran in fighting the PKK and PJAK through the Supreme Security Committee of Iran and Turkey(). Consequently, Turkey was able to limit the attacks of the Kurds against it. Ankara and Tehran accuse the United States of America and Israel, along with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and some European Union countries, of being behind these groups by financing and training them().
It highlights the extent to which Turkey has been affected by Iranian cooperation in this field. When the Syrian revolution erupted and the Turkish-Iranian positions conflicted, the Al-Bab organization was able to escalate its operation in Turkey, which hints at a hidden Iranian role.
The extent of the impact of the absence of security coordination in this regard between the two countries, especially since Iran uses the Kurds, accompanied by Damascus, as a pressure card against Ankara in the north of Syria because it supports the armed factions that are fighting the Syrian regime.
Operation Olive Branch took place in 2018(). The operation took place after the historic reconciliation between Iran and Turkey despite Iran’s criticism of it through Russia. Such operation took place after a Turkish-Iranian-Russian agreement to confront the American influence in the region which was supporting Kurdish groups under the pretext of fighting ISIS().
The Asian Caucasian issues
In the rest of the countries such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, Turkey has a broader influence through the common cultural and linguistic base.
An expert on Caucasus affairs, Zaur Gazimov, summed up Turkey's influence in the South Caucasus, emphasizing that Turkey is among the beneficiaries of the situation after the Iranian military exercises: “So I say that cooperation between Ankara and Baku has become more important at least for Baku, and Gazimov believes that Turkey’s deep military relations with Iran’s eastern neighbor Pakistan are increasing Tehran’s concern by inflaming sectarian tensions, Turkey and Pakistan are Sunni Muslim countries and Shiite Iran." ()
Turkey has managed to extend its relations in these areas in a very noticeable manner and has imposed itself as a regional player similar to its intervention with Baku against Armenia and deepening its relationship with Pakistan, with which it shares the ruling political background, and similar to its influence in the rest of the South Caucasus regions. This is what pushes Iran towards an alliance with Russia which considers this region as its backyard.
Leadership conflict during the Arab spring
The Syrian revolution
Turkey supported the spring movements in general, and Iran also saw it as an extension of its revolution.
But the revolution in Syria changed Iran's position when the protests reached its traditional ally in the Middle East.
Turkey supported the Sunni groups of the Opposition. On the other hand, Iran backed the regime.
Despite this sharp dispute that was looming between the Iranian and Turkish parties, some went to the possibility of a military clash between them. The trade relations between the two countries were never affected, as shown previously.
Despite the different goals and major diplomatic problems that occurred between the two countries to avoid confrontation, even Russia was around the corner in a clash with Turkey due to the downing of its plane by the Turks(), but the Russian-Iranian fears of American expansion in the region prompted them to establish an alliance with the Turkish side. Turkey, despite the incompatibility of interests between them().
While Turkey knows very well that America will not sacrifice its strategic ally in the region since it is one of the most important members of NATO, which is what prompts Turkey to move with relative comfort within what includes its interests with all parties.
Syria is now living in a state of division between the major regional and international powers, where each one is satisfied with certain areas of influence within its strategic interests.
Iraq Question
The nature of the dispute is that after the withdrawal of America from Iraq, Turkey does not want Iran to control it. Iran, which immediately after the fall of Saddam's regime was able to dominate the country's political scene through the rise of the Shiite sectarian ideology linked to Iran to power.
With the assassination of the Iranian militia leader in Iraq, the de facto ruler of Iraq, Qassem Soleimani, and Iran's man in the Middle East, and despite Turkey taking a position of consoling Iran when he was assassinated by American planes, Turkey also took advantage of the Iraqi atmosphere rejecting Iranian influence in Iraq, where protests took place in late 2019(). it represented a great opportunity for the Turks to compete with Iran in Iraq.
With the US withdrawal, Turkey cannot shift the regional balances in the region by leaving Iran in control of Iraq. Since Ankara is Tehran's first economic competitor in Iraq, it managed to record in 2019 exports worth 10.2 billion dollars of goods to Iraq, () slightly exceeding Iran's exports of 9.6 billion dollars during the same period, according to the same magazine().
Turkish companies have also invested about $25 billion in 900 construction and infrastructure projects - including power, water, and petrochemical industries - in different Iraqi cities().
Similar to the economic competition, Turkish military operations took place in the Sinjar area against the PKK groups there, which are entrenched within the Popular Mobilization militias, the arm of Iran. This was manifested in the posts of both the Turkish Foreign Minister and his Iranian counterpart on Twitter’s platform().
On February 28, 2021, the crisis deepened further when both countries recalled their ambassadors().
The Palestinian Question
Both Turkey and Iran claim that they are the defenders of the Palestinian cause. Turkish relations with Hamas improved during the Syrian revolution.
Turkey and Iran do not miss any opportunity to market themselves as the biggest defenders of the Palestinian cause in the region, as both sides are pursuing a certain policy in the interest of the Palestinian cause.
Ankara, which has very good relations with Israel, has entered into an argument several times with it, and great diplomatic tension, But this did not prevent Turkey from finding a foothold in the Palestinian cause, and the incident began with Erdogan’s speech against Shimon Peres in 2009 at the Davos conference(), and a year later, the Turkish Marmara ship destined to break the siege on Gaza, in which Turkish citizens were killed, which caused a severe crisis between Turkey and Israel()
While it was Iran that was able to market itself as a state of resistance to the Zionist project in the region, and a war that was waged by Hezbollah in 2006 contributed to highlighting it as a country that militarily adopted the Palestinian cause.
Iran is also one of the biggest supporters of the Islamic movement Hamas in Gaza, and it is the strongest faction that is fighting the Israelis now.
As for Ankara, it maintains very good relations with the Palestinian Authority, represented by Fatah and Hamas in Gaza, while Iran has a near-cold relationship with Fatah.
In light of the Arab silence towards the Palestinian issue, Turkey and Iran are moving to take positions towards it, most recently against Trump’s project known as the Deal of the Century, as Ankara and Tehran condemned the designation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel(), with the involvement of many Arab countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain within this project().
It enabled the unification of Turkey and Iran on this file recently, as the Iranian Prime Minister called on Ankara to cooperate in the Palestinian issue, despite Iran's recent fears of Turkey's popularity, which has overshadowed its expense().
This made it reconsider the matter of this file and invite Turkey to work together on it, while Tehran and Ankara represent, the Palestinian actor, Hamas, a great supporter, and the interest of uniting their efforts is in his favor.
Where Iran, Turkey, and Hamas share the intellectual background of the “school of political Islam.” With the fall of the Egyptian regime in 2013, Hamas became the last incubator of political Islam in the region and a reliable ally, while we could not abandon Tehran, its primary supporter by arming it. Although some slight differences.
But ideologically, Ankara remains closer to Hamas than Tehran, as they share a Sunni background, while Iran, which has a Shiite background, is viewed with great caution because of its missionary project in the region.
Turkey and Iran remain active players in the Palestinian issue due to the absence of any Arab power in the region and light of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement, especially Saudi Arabia, the traditional rival of Iran and Turkey in the leadership of the Islamic world.
Gulf crisis
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, along with other Arab countries, announced a blockade of Qatar on June 5, 2017(), and this comes against the backdrop of an Arab-Arab conflict, regarding support for the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
Doha owns one of the most important soft powers in the region, the Al-Jazeera network, which paved the way for the Arab Spring and played a major role in it and even in marketing the image of politicians affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
As for the axis that announced the siege of Qatar, it was completely rejecting the Arab Spring movements, as Saudi Arabia adopted a hostile stance against the popular protests and embraced the President of Tunisia, Ben Ali, who sought refuge in it. As for Egypt, the military general Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi managed to overthrow Morsi in 2013 and return the country to its Square one While Bahrain succeeded in suppressing the protests that accused Tehran of standing behind them. As for the Emirates, it is what is referred to as the state that supports all financial and logistical counter-revolutions and has openly announced this.
The Arab League also issued a statement declaring the Brotherhood a terrorist organization in 2013, as most of its leaders fleeing Egypt are located in Turkey and Qatar.
The conditions are preparing for the blockade of Doha with a green light from the Trump administration.
Here, Turkey and Iran jumped to support Doha, Tehran, which has been at war with Saudi Arabia since its revolution in 1978, and Turkey, which lives in a tense political relationship with the Gulf states and Riyadh in particular, as Riyadh considers Ankara a serious competitor for its dominance over the Sunni-majority Islamic world.
Here, Turkey and Iran jumped to support Doha, Tehran, which has been at war with Saudi Arabia since its revolution in 1978, and Turkey, which lives in a tense political relationship with the Gulf states and Riyadh in particular, as Riyadh considers Ankara a serious competitor for its dominance over the Sunni-majority Islamic world.
In the Qatari calculations, Turkey is a strategic partner by the agreement signed with Qatar at the end of 2014, and therefore it was expected that Ankara would do what it had done under these agreements, in addition to the fact that Doha was the first to condemn, in July 2016, the coup attempt. failed in Turkey, and therefore it was reasonable to expect that the favor would be repaid in time of need().
For the Iranian side, the outbreak of the Gulf crisis against Qatar represented a golden opportunity. The crisis led to the dismantling of the regional axis of countries that had been working in recent years to repel Iranian influence in the region. The crisis has also distracted the regional and international focus on dealing with Iranian policies as the biggest source of danger, and many countries and groups were forced to approach Iran and Turkey in an attempt to protect themselves from the encroachment of the Quartet axis. Tehran took the opportunity to get closer to Qatar and sent positive messages through several officials calling for a solution to the crisis through dialogue, and at the same time expressing its willingness to help break the siege().
Conclusion
To conclude it is very crucial to mention that the relationship between the two sides is complicated. In this sense, their relationship is characterized by both enmity and friendship. However, it is worthy to note that it is unlikely that a direct clash between the two powers could take place because they need each other. To be much more precise, Turkey needs Iranian energy and on the other side, Iran needs Turkish goods.
Similar to the economic cooperation between the two countries, and the open competition between them in many files, which makes the relationship oscillate between enmity and friendship, the regional and global reality imposes on the two countries cooperation and overcoming differences because the threat to them is shared by other regional powers such as Israel and the Gulf states. However, recently, Ankara has tended to open new channels with the Gulf states, which irritates Tehran, but it will not affect much in the relations between them in the future.
Bibliography
- Arwa Ibrahim. Beating the blockade: How Qatar prevailed over a siege. ALJAZEERA.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/5/beating-the-blockade-how-qatar-prevailed-over-a-siege
-Alberto Gasparetto. ran, Turkey and the Qatar Crisis with the GCC. Emerging Middle Powers in the Middle East and their Struggle for Hegemony.IMEIS Annual Conference 2019 Publisher: Global Policy Journal.
- CNN.2010.Turkish prime minister heads to Iran for nuclear talks.
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/05/16/iran.brazil.talks/index.html
- Ünsal Bana. 2015. Yeni Safak. İran nükleer müzakerelerinin Türkiye ekonomisine etkisi.
- Simon Cameron-Moore. 2010. Leaders of Turkey, Brazil pin hopes on Iran deal. Reutres.
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-turkey-analysis-idUKTRE64G5ND20100517
- Hsan Bal, M. Turgut Demirtepe. "USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations". Vol. 5. International Strategic Research Organization (USAK). 2012.
- Elik, Suleyman. Iran–Turkey Relations, 1979–2011: Conceptualising the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and Security in Middle-Power States. Routledge. 2013.
- Mevlut Cavusoglu. The Meaning of Operation Olive Branch. ForeignPolicy. 2018.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/05/the-meaning-of-operation-olive-branch/
- Michael J. Totten. THE TROUBLE WITH TURKEY: Erdogan, ISIS, and the Kurds.JSTOR.
-Zaur Gazimov. Turkey’s ambitions in the Caucasus strain relations with Iran. RFI.2021.
https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20211211-turkey-s-caucasus-region-ambitions-strains-relationship-with-iran
- Hamidreza Azizi, Vali Golmohammadi. Are Iran and Turkey on a Collision Course in Iraq. The National Interest. March 2021.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/are-iran-and-turkey-collision-course-iraq-179902
- The Guardian. Recep Erdogan storms out of Davos after clash with Israeli president over Gaza. 2009.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/30/turkish-prime-minister-gaza-davos
- BBC news.Mavi Marmara: Why did Israel stop the Gaza flotilla?
https://www.bbc.com/news/10203726
- Roie Yellinek. The Gulf states, the “deal of the century,” and the Iranian threat. Mei@75.
https://www.mei.edu/publications/gulf-states-deal-century-and-iranian-threat
-CRISISGROUP :
.Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer
.Turkey and Iran: Bitter Friends, Bosom Rivals. 2016.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/b051-turkey-and-iran-bitter-friends-bosom-rivals
-Hugh Naylor,Andrew Roth.NATO faces new Mideast crisis after downing of Russian jet by Turkey. WashingtonPost. 2015.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkey-downs-russian-military-aircraft-near-syrias-border/2015/11/24/9e8e0c42-9288-11e5-8aa0-5d0946560a97_story.html
اترك تعليقا 💬
كل التعليقات
لا تعليقات حتى الآن.